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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION REMAiNs INTACT-Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases
in 1883,1 the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional
law that the action inhibited by the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment2 is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the states.3 "The
amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however dis-
criminatory or wrongful." 4 Thus private conduct, no matter how discrim-
inatory, in no way violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment unless the state, to some significant extent,5 becomes involved
in this conduct.0 As a result, what is now recognized as the "state action"
doctrine7 has developed" and expanded 9 to the point that it is now difficult
'109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2 US. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privilege or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
8 Justice Bradley reasoned in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8 (1883), that if the
first section of the fourteenth amendment were not limited to state action, then the
effect of the amendment would be to destroy the federal system.
4Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1, at 13 (1948); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
5 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). See also Seiden-
berg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (SD.N.Y. 1970). "Accordingly
the issue has usually been resolved-almost always in favor of finding state action-
by reference to the kind and degree of state involvement alleged. The issue has been
posed in terms of whether 'to some significant extent the State in any of its manifesta-
tions' has become involved in the discriminatory practice under attack." Id. at 596-97.6 See US. v. Williams, 341 US. 70, 92 (1951) (Douglas, J, dissenting): "The four-
teenth amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done
by individuals." This had been the Court's early view, see e.g., Hodges v. U.S., 203 US.
1 (1906); U.S. v. Harris, 106 US. 629 (1882); and remains the Court's view today, see
e.g., US. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Paynes
v. Lee, 239 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D.La. 1965).
t E.g., Brown v. City of Richmond, 204 Va. 471, 132 S.E.2d 495, (1963):
Private action is action taken voluntarily and not by state compulsion. State action
is action taken by the state or a political subdivision, or by a person or persons
acting for the state or political subdivision, or pursuant to their authority or
direction, or in obedience to their requirement. Id. at 479, 132 S.E.2d at 500.
Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).8 The doctrine grew out of the fourteenth amendment. For discussion of the history
of the doctrine, see Silard, A Constution 'l Forecast: Demise of the "State Action"
Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966).
) The decade of the fifties experienced school desegregation, while the sixties saw the
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to conceive of situations in which the state is not involved to some extent.'0
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court decided in Moose Lodge No.
107 V. Irvis" that the State of Pennsylvania was not significantly involved
in the discriminatory conduct of the Moose Lodge so as to render its con-
duct "state action," conflicting with the fourteenth amendment.' 2
Irvis, a black, accompanied by a member of the Lodge, sought service in
the dining room of the Lodge. Defendant Moose Lodge in accordance with
its by-laws13 refused service to the plaintiff. As a result, Irvis brought a
civil action in the Pennsylvania District Court claiming a deprivation of
his rights,14 asserting that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued
the Moose Lodge a private club liquor license,15 the refusal of service to
him was "state action" for the purposes of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. However, the United States Supreme Court decided
on a factual basis that such action did not constitute significant "state
action." 16
sit-in movement shine additional light on the unequal position of blacks. One can see
in these past two decades a general improvement in the plight of blacks, and the ex-
pansion of state action in four areas:
(1) The individual acting under "color of law."
(2) The non-official individual or group action so much under governmental authority
as to be viewed as engaging in state action.
(3) The concept of governmental refusal or fashion to act as fulfilling the requirement
of state action.
(4) State action found in judicial enforcement of private agreements and the supervi-
sion of private relationships.
See Williams, The Twiligbt of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347 (1963) [herein cited
as Williams].0 Williams, supra note 9: "While in the past it has been possible to use the finding
of state action as the determining factor in deciding whether constitutional rights have
been violated, we are now substantially at the end of this road." Id. at 367.
11407 U.S. 163 (1972).
12 Id. The Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to a guest because he
was a black does not, under the circumstances here presented, violate the fourteenth
amendment.
13 General Laws of the Loyal Order of Moose, § 92.1: To Prevent Admission of Non-
Members. This section grants guest privileges only to those eligible for membership
which in essence eliminates any black guest, as membership is limited to male caucasians.
14 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
1 5 RFGULATIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, § 113.09 (June 1970 ed.).
The case turns on the fact that the Court did not feel the license granted under this
regulation was significant state action.
16 Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D.Penn. 1970). This case appeared before the
United States Supreme Court on appeal from the District Court where it was decided
that the license granted the club governed by its constitution restricting membership and
entry on premises was invalid as violative of equal protection of the laws, particularly
in view of regulations requiring every licensed club "to adhere to all the provisions of
its constitution and by-laws"' See note 15 supra.
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Although "state action" has been much discussed since its inception, "only
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involve-
ment of the state in private conduct be attributed its true significance.'"7 17
However, as increasing numbers of cases have been decided, incidences of
"state action" have been increasingly found.'8
To understand the Court's reasoning and failure to find significant "state
action," one must factually distinguish the principal case from previous cases
to determine that a practical solution was reached. One cannot compare
the constitutional rights of a private club to those of a lessee of public prop-
erty,19 to those of a public eating facility,20 or to the law governing land
transactions, 21 because these areas are public, whereas the overriding purpose
of the Moose Lodge is to maintain its position of selectivity and privacy.22
Although the principal case is obviously distinguishable from these others,
this is in no way an adequate explanation of the failure to find significant
"state action," or an explanation of what may be the reversal of a trend.
The clause in the liquor license that Irvis contended to be significant
"state action" stated that every licensed club must "adhere to all of the
provisions of its constitution and by-laws." 2- The Court justified this clause
in part, noting that it was inserted to prevent any subterfuge 4 on the part
of club owners wishing to come under the private club exception to the
17See Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, at 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1970): "No simple or precise test for distinguishing between state action
and private action has, however, yet been devised, in spite of 'eight decades of meta-
physical writhing around the state action doctrine."
'
8 E.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, at 202 (1970) (separate opinion
of Brennan, J.); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 US. 296 (1966); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville,
373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
McCabe v. Atcheson, Topeka, & S.F. Ry., 235 US. 151 (1914).
19 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
20 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
21Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co,
392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
22 There is no contention on either side concerning the private nature of the Lodge
as the Constitution of the Supreme Lodge states: "[Mlembership of lodges shall be com-
posed of male persons of the Caucasian or White race above the age of twenty-one
years, and not married to someone of any other than the Caucasian or White race,
who are of good moral character, physically and mentally normal, and who shall profess
a belief in a Supreme Being."
23 See note 15 supra.
24 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). Often the label "private club" is used to evade
regulations of liquor authorities and statutes concerning public accommodations that
must serve all persons. See also Annot, 8 A.L.R. Fed. 634 (1971).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 Despite the purpose of the regulation, it does not
explain the Court's refusal to find any significant "state action." 2 0
Nor can one explain the decision by the fact that the state was not directly
exerting any control, "as 'state action,' for purposes of the equal protection
clause, may emanate from rulings of administrative and regulatory agencies
as well as from legislative or judicial action." 27 Perhaps no explanation ex-
ists why the Supreme Court could find no significant "state action," 28 but
there is strong precedent for the ultimate decision.29
Present reasoning of the "state action" theory has developed considerably
from the traditional approach that has been relied on in so many previous
cases, and that seems to have been relied on in the principal case. Closer
analysis will better explain why the United States Supreme Court decided
as it did in Moose Lodge.
The "state action" concept has expanded to such an extent that numerous
authorities contend that the search for "state action" is a "misleading
search," 3o that a form of "state action" can always be found, and that the
Supreme Court should analyze the problem in a different manner.31 One
who pleads that such interference is not "state action" may have little on
25 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970).
26 See 1970 Wisc. L. REv. 595 (1970). Because the license is the extent of the state's
involvement, the emphasis should not fall upon the nature of the enterprise but upon
the nature of the license granted to that enterprise. This relates to further arguments
concerning the idea of whether the license is a right or a privilege.
For further discussion on the disagreement over this distinction, see Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 740-41 (1964).27 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964).
28 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (opinion of Brennan, J., dis-
senting) :
Our prior decisions leave no doubt that the mere existence of efforts by the State,
through legislation or otherwise, to authorize, encourage, or otherwise support
racial discrimination in a particular facet of life constitutes illegal state involve-
ment in those pertinent private acts of discrimination that subsequently occur."
Id. at 190.29 E.g., Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) affirmed 352 U.S. 903
(1956):
In their private affairs, in the conduct of their private businesses, it is clear that
the people themselves have the liberty to select their own associates and the
persons with whom they will do business, unimpaired by the fourteenth amend-
ment.... Indeed, we think that such liberty is guaranteed by the due process
clause of that Amendment. Id. at 715.30 See Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
31 St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action Equal
Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MiCH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Van
Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of
State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347, at 389-90 (1963). Williams contends that the better
test would determine whether the private club has so moved into the area of public
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which to rely other than the Civil Rights Cases, while "his opponent, on
the other hand, has a whole quiverful of modern cases, out of which he can
develop more or less appealing analogies." 32 Thus, the real determination
should not be a consideration of whether the state has acted, but rather a
balancing of two complimentary principles: the right of the individual to
pick his own associates in order to express his preferences and dislikes, and
to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses,
versus the constitutional ban in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment against state-sponsored racial inequality..33 This balancing proc-
ess would eliminate an overly rigid doctrine, and such a "rule of reason"
would render adequate protection to the authentic private life which does
not fall under application of the equal protection clause 34
Private clubs have been spared the attacks inflicted upon other discrimina-
tory bodies,35 even in this era in which minority groups have been accorded
increased recognition of their constitutional rights. Indeed, the private club,
as long as it does not move out into the area of public concern as have the
labor unions, should face no constitutional inhibition prohibiting discrimina-
tion. Some have suggested that the private club can turn away a black non-
member solely because it can turn away the white non-member 36 This
view exemplifies the error of the traditional "state action" analysis because
"[i]t fails to recognize the valuable right of the person or truly private
group to engage in all manner of discriminations, except as they may be
specifically outlawed by affirmative state regulations." 3 7
While the pervasive nature of the liquor license initially places the label
of "state action" upon the discriminatory policies of the Moose Lodge, closer
analysis in light of the "balancing test" suggests that the Court has decided
correctly in protecting the private rights of the individual. In determining
concern that the public's interest in eliminating the particular discrimination must out-
weigh the personal right to discriminate.32 BIack, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 69, at 89 (1967-68): "The only thing settled and clear is that 'state
action' or relevant 'state action' is necessary, in some quantity or kind, to the invocation
of the equal protection clause."
33 E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See also Silard, supra note 8; Williams,
The T'wilight of State Action, 41 TaxAs L. Rxv. 347 (1963).
84See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Note For a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
473, 483 n. 20 (1962). The article discusses the limitation of the fourteenth amendment
when it collides with another constitutional guarantee.
35 1970 Wisc. L. REv. 595 (1970). However, this may soon be a myth, as Moose Lodge
may only be the first step in an all out attack upon the discriminatory action of the
private club. See also Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 1969, at 14, col. 1.
36 Schwelb, The Sit-In Demonstration: Criminal Trespass or Constitutional Right? 36
N. Y. U. L. REv. 779, 799 (1961).
37 Williams, supra note 9, at 381.
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whether there was significant "state action," the Court did not intend to re-
verse the trend of the sixties, but to establish the point at which the consti-
tutional right of the private individual or club to discriminate should be
protected.
Various articles have evaluated the concept of "state action" resulting in
an omission of the consideration of the valid right of individuals and private
groups to engage in a multitude of discrimination in our society.38 Indeed,
courts considering this problem on the traditional basis of a finding of "state
action" have often ignored this significant competing consideration. Never-
theless, one should look beyond the traditional approach of locating "state
action" and deal with the merits of the constitutional issue. In so doing, the
government will be able to protect purely private discrimination while at
the same time prevent any state-involved discriminatory practice39
W. D. B.
3 8 E.g., St. Antoine, supra note 31; Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 213 (1956); Schwelb, supra note 36. One may note that the few who
do recognize the freedom to discriminate do so sparingly. Compare also Van Alstyne &
.Karst, supra note 31; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083
(1960).
39 E.g., 46 N. C. L. Rzv. 149 (1967); Williams, supra note 9.
